Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s post-2014 growing proximity to the United States is seen by some analysts as having generated mistrust in Russia. Yet, despite Modi going so far as to virtually campaign for Donald Trump with the slogan “Abki Bar Trump Sarkar” and embracing him like a soulmate, it did not prevent Trump from slapping India with a 25 per cent tariff and penalty. From India’s perspective, this was not diplomacy; it was a national embarrassment—one man’s blind friendship costing the country dearly. It was a foreign policy disaster of epic proportions.
Over the past decade, India has drawn closer to the United States, tentatively aligning itself with Washington while continuing to eschew formal alliances. The Indian leadership welcomed Trump’s return to the White House because of the apparent chemistry between Trump and Modi. India soon realised its miscalculation and began reassessing its American gamble as Trump flipped from friend to not-so-friend, ramping up pressure on New Delhi. The increased tariffs were ostensibly meant to penalise India for its continued purchase of Russian oil.
It was during Modi’s tilt towards the US that the India–Russia partnership first encountered serious turbulence. For the first time since 2021, India and Russia went for an extended period without signing a major arms deal. Modi also refrained from publicly supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine. In fact, several arms agreements were cancelled or suspended, including those for 49 new Mi-17 helicopters and the modernisation of Su-30 MKI fighters. There is no denying that this phase created distance, for the first time, in Indo-Russian relations and also prompted Russia to improve its ties with Pakistan.
Trump further irked the Indian establishment by agreeing to a raft of deals with India’s neighbour and rival, Pakistan. In an apparent response, Modi attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin in November 2025, where he met Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping. India’s most striking response to American pressure came when Modi visited China. The images of Modi alongside Xi and Putin were powerful and politically loaded.
What a difference a few months make. The last time Modi and Trump met at the White House, bilateral ties appeared to be riding high. “We missed you,” Trump said as he received one of Modi’s signature full-body bear hugs. Within just seven months, the relationship plunged to its lowest point. There is no simple explanation, but publicly at least, Washington has pointed fingers at Russia. US Trade Advisor Peter Navarro openly accused New Delhi of financing the Kremlin’s war machine, even going so far as to label the Russia–Ukraine conflict “Modi’s war”.
In the past, the $5.43 billion deal for the S-400 Triumf long-range surface-to-air missile system was signed in 2018 despite the threat of secondary sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). The deal was intended to assuage a hurt Russian leadership and mend Indo-Russian ties, at least to some extent.
This time, both Putin and Modi had their own agendas. Putin wanted to demonstrate that he was not a pariah and that there were countries willing not only to engage with him but to welcome him, despite Western pressure over Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Modi, on the other hand, wanted to signal that he would not “give in to the pressure from Donald Trump”.
Even before arriving, Putin questioned the logic behind Washington’s sanctions. “The United States itself still buys nuclear fuel from us for its nuclear power plants,” he remarked, adding that “if the US has the right to buy Russian fuel, India should enjoy the same privilege.” It was a clear rebuff to Trump.
What, then, are the key takeaways from Putin’s visit to India? The visit was significant for several reasons. It was Putin’s first visit since the Ukraine war and came after a gap of four years, instead of the usual annual summits. It also followed the United States imposing a cumulative 50 per cent tariff burden on India, leaving New Delhi feeling increasingly vulnerable. India’s central challenge was to balance Putin’s expectations with America’s red lines.
Putin likely pressed Modi privately to increase purchases of Russian oil. Although India depends on Russian crude for only about one to two per cent of its needs and could technically revert to traditional suppliers in the Arab and Islamic world, New Delhi had to weigh how far it wanted to cock a snook at the US President and disregard the threat of American sanctions.
Clearly, India will use Russia as leverage to send a message to Washington that it needs to “look at us afresh” and that it cannot “really do whatever it wants” in its outreach to Pakistan and China. Putin has unequivocally declared that Moscow would remain a steady and uninterrupted supplier for India’s fast-emerging economy. Russia, he emphasised, is a reliable trade partner and a long-standing, trustworthy friend. Both leaders have agreed to take the Indo-Russia economic partnership to new heights by 2030.
India’s political non-monogamy underlines the principle that governs its relations with all foreign powers. India’s commitment to strategic autonomy and multi-alignment is sacrosanct to its foreign policy; it refuses to be dependent on any single power. Regardless of its historical defence ties with Russia or its economic reliance on the United States, India has never chosen one camp. It has consistently navigated between them and is likely to pursue the same pragmatic course in the current geopolitical environment..
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